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Abstract: In light of the empirical evidence on clientelism and ethno-regional favouritism in 
African politics, the present paper examines the relationship between ethnic divisions and 
clientelism. Specifically, we ask whether – and what type of – ethnic divisions affect the 
experiences with, perceived prevalence of, and attitudes to clientelism. Empirical findings drawing 
on data for more than 20 000 respondents across 15 African countries challenge the dominant role 
of ethnic divisions for clientelist practices in Africa. Contextual measures of ethnic fragmentation 
and ethnic identification are found to have limited explanatory power for the concerned clientelism 
outcomes, and, considering possible subjects of ethno-regional favouritism, the empirical findings 
point more to the relevance of regional than ethnically based targeting of clientelist transfers.  
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1 Introduction 
 
African politics is often described as clientelist. Scholars stress that African rulers tend to rely 
on the distribution of personal favours in exchange for political support, and that voting is 
often based on particularized loyalties based in kinship and ethnic ties and to what extent 
benefits accrue to the own group rather than broad-based policy accountability (see discussion 
in Wantchekon, 2003; Kimenyi, 2006; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Vicente, 2008; and 
Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009). 
Clientelism  can be  defined  as  transactions  between politicians and citizens whereby 
material  favours – goods or services – are  offered  in  return  for political  support at  the 
polls (Wantchekon, 2003). As such, politics relying on clientelism focuses on private transfers 
rather than provision of public goods or projects of national interest. Not only is this likely to 
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have significant distributional consequences, it could also discourage a democratic system 
where citizens vote for broad-based policy accountability rather than narrow personal gain, 
and where governments formulate development policy that places the long-term common 
good ahead of short-sighted narrow and local interests. Understanding clientelism is thus 
important from a democratic, economic and development policy perspective.  
In the African context, clientelism is often suggested to have an ethnic dimension. 
Ethnically based parties tend to redistribute towards their ethnic group rather than provide 
public goods, the argument goes, and citizens tend to vote for candidates who represent their 
group, regardless of quality (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Kudamatsu, 2009; Burgess et al., 2013; 
Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2012). That 
some voters are less stringent in terms of holding politicians accountable is suggested to 
undermine the quality of political candidates and lead to undesirable governance outcomes 
such as corruption (Banerjee and Pande, 2007). In line with this, a large literature links ethnic 
diversity to low public goods provision and poor governance more generally (see e.g. Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Miguel and 
Gugerty, 2005; Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007). 
Implicit in the above arguments is the idea that clientelism should be more widespread in 
ethnically divided societies. However, we are not aware of any studies exploring this 
assumption directly. Against this background, the present study aims to investigate the 
relationship between ethnic divisions and clientelism. Specifically, we ask whether – and 
what type of – ethnic divisions affect the experiences with, perceived prevalence of, and 
attitudes to clientelism. Our empirical findings, drawing on data for more than 20 000 
respondents across 15 African countries, challenge the dominant role of ethnic divisions for 
clientelist practices in Africa. Contextual measures of ethnic fragmentation and ethnic 
identification are found to have limited explanatory power for the concerned clientelism 
outcomes, and, considering possible subjects of ethno-regional favouritism, the empirical 
findings arguably point more to the relevance of regionally than ethnically based targeting of 
clientelist transfers.  
 
2 Clientelism and ethnic divisions 
 
Above, we described clientelism as the distribution of particularistic benefits in exchange for 
political support. While the exact definitions vary, clientelism is often described as based on 
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patron-client relationships involving repeated and contingent exchange (for an overview, see 
Hickens, 2011). The contingent nature of the exchange between patron and client sets 
clientelism apart from other forms of particularism that target specific groups (e.g. farmers or 
poor households) for programmatic reasons (e.g. increasing farm productivity or alleviating 
poverty). In clientelism, targeting comes with strings attached; politicians distribute benefits 
to individuals or groups that support or promise to support them, and citizens support 
politicians who deliver or promise to deliver benefits in return for their electoral support 
(Hickens, 2011). 
With this description in mind, clientelism can take many forms, ranging from outright 
vote buying involving the distribution of rewards to individuals in exchange for votes before 
an election, to electoral promises of postelection particularistic benefits (e.g. goods, 
government jobs, education, health care and infrastructure). Considering that it involves 
rewards in exchange for political support ahead of elections, vote buying is often 
characterized as a particular form of clientelism (Kramon, 2011). Yet, vote buying too can 
come in many shapes, differing in terms of the type of rewards offered and the extent and type 
of monitoring and targeting of voters (Nichter, 2008). 
In this paper, we consider experiences with and perceptions of vote buying, as well as 
attitudes to clientelism in a wider sense. Below, we discuss the role of credibility for 
clientelist exchanges, and why ethnic divisions may be relevant in this context. 
 
2.1 The role of credibility 
 
A unifying theme in the literature on clientelism in general and vote buying in particular is the 
emphasis on the role played by political credibility. First, a political system characterised by 
low credibility could help explain why politicians turn to clientelism. Keefer and Vlaicu 
(2008) describe how in an environment where political competitors cannot make credible 
commitments to broad groups of voters, they resort to clientelist appeals to members of their 
clientelist network. Their argument can help explain why young democracies, where political 
reputations are typically less developed, engage in more targeted transfers. In line with this, 
Bratton (2008) describes how in African politics programmatic promises are often judged as 
lacking credibility and as being very similar across contending parties, making voters choose 
among candidates based less on distinctive policy positions than on the candidates’ assumed 
reliability as prospective patrons. 
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Second, having resorted to clientelism, politicians need to establish credibility in the 
clientelist exchange. Clientelist exchange – whether it is politicians offering gifts in exchange 
for promised votes or citizens offering their votes in exchange for promised post-election 
benefits – requires one of the parties to trust that the other will deliver on their promises 
(Hickens, 2011). Hence, politicians need to signal that they are credible patrons, as well as 
define a dependable clientelist network.  
With respect to the former, there is first of all most likely an incumbency advantage; with 
public-sector resources at their disposal ahead of the elections, incumbents are arguably more 
credible than their challengers in delivering on clientelist promises (see e.g. the results of 
Wantchekon, 2003, and Collier and Vicente, 2012). Furthermore, political candidates can 
actively seek to build credibility as patrons. In particular, it has been suggested that politicians 
use vote buying to signal that they are trustworthy providers of future patronage goods. In a 
Kenyan field experiment exploring citizen responses to the reported use of vote buying among 
politicians, Kramon (2011) finds that with voters who reasonably expect that they are on the 
receiving end of a politician’s particularistic transfers – the poor and co-ethnics of the 
politician – vote buying improves the politician’s ratings. With the wealthy and non-coethnics 
of the politician, i.e. those who might not expect to benefit from such transfers, on the other 
hand, it does not. Hence, Kramon argues that politicians buy votes because of the information 
it conveys to voters about their credibility with respect to the provision of targeted goods to 
poor voters. As vote buying signals credibility as a patron for the poor, it is most effective 
with poor voters. And, in line with what we discussed above, where the poor have low 
expectations about politician credibility regarding programmatic promises, do not expect to 
benefit from such policies, or lack the resources to monitor policy performance, signalling 
credibility as a patron can be an effective means of building political support. The findings of 
Jensen and Justesen (2014), who study poverty and vote buying in a large African sample, 
confirm that poor voters are more likely to be targets of vote buying than wealthier voters.   
Turning to the clientelist network, a relevant question is to how broad of a segment of the 
population politicians can credibly commit and expect the corresponding commitment in 
return at the polls. A clientelist network is defined precisely by the ability of members to 
make mutually credible commitments (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). This brings us to the role of 
ethnic divisions. 
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2.2 The role of ethnic divisions 
 
Since politicians are usually unable to observe how votes are cast, they must develop 
reasonable predictions about voter behaviour (Hickens, 2011). Ethnic group affiliations could 
in this context be used as a proxy and as a way to delineate the clientelist network. This could 
be effective considering that members of ethnic groups share language and kinship ties and 
are often geographically concentrated just as the goods that the state provides, and that ethnic 
identities are ascriptive and therefore naturally limit the size of coalitions to compete for 
resources (Kasara, 2007). Clientelist promises are more credible when there is an expectation 
that the relationship will be ongoing (Hickens, 2011), and in this context ethnic group 
affiliations arguably have the advantage that they are perceived as relatively fixed.  
Van de Walle (2003) describes how African political parties tend to gain power when 
they can make a credible claim to represent a certain ethnic, regional or linguistic segment of 
the population. He argues that even if members of an ethnic community do not have distinct 
policy preferences, or if the clientelistic patronage networks do not spread across much of the 
ethnic group, citizens still vote to place ethnic representatives in positions where, they 
believe, the national pie is divided. Furthermore, the presence of ethnically based clientelism 
is likely to create a vicious cycle; if other parties adopt appeals to ethnic loyalties and 
clientelism, it is difficult for a programmatic party to win. Voters will support the clientelist 
party because they know they will benefit from the programmatic party whether or not they 
voted for it, while they will get no access to targeted benefits if another ethnic-clientelist party 
that they do not support wins (van de Walle, 2003). 
Hence, targeting their clientelist appeals, politicians arguably use ethnic affiliations as a 
proxy for voter behaviour. Still, it is not clear what this implies for the relationship between 
ethnic divisions and the prevalence of and attitudes to clientelism. It is interesting to consider 
both the contextual (country or local) level and the individual level. 
At the contextual level, the presence of politically salient ethnic divisions around which 
one could organise clientelist networks and ethnically based targeted benefits could 
reasonably imply a greater prevalence of clientelism. Clientelism being more common could 
in turn translate into it being perceived as normal procedure, i.e. into greater acceptance of 
clientelism as a natural part of the political system. On the other hand, a high prevalence of 
clientelism in divided societies could raise awareness of the democratic problems involved in 
this practice.  
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At the individual level, citizens’ attitudes to clientelism are, according to the reasoning 
above, likely to depend on whether they perceive themselves as on the receiving end of 
clientelist appeals. This could imply that co-ethnics of the politicians in power take a more 
favourable position toward clientelism. Citizens may expect politicians who provide 
patronage to channel resources to their co-ethnics. As studies of ethnic favouritism by 
politicians demonstrate (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2013; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Hodler and 
Rachky, 2011; Kramon and Posner, 2012), such expectations are not unfounded. Thus, in 
signalling credibility as a distributor of patronage, vote buying could help build support 
amongst co-ethnics, who may believe they have a chance of benefitting from future targeted 
benefits, while reducing support amongst non-coethnics, who may not expect to receive future 
transfers (Kramon, 2011).  
Then again, it is not evident that co-ethnics of politicians in power perceive themselves as 
benefitting from their clientelist appeals. First, while the clientelist network to which a 
politician can make a credible promise may be ethnically homogenous, it may still be 
narrower than the ethnic group – clients may be more likely to be co-ethnics, but most co-
ethnics are still excluded from the clientelist network (Keefer, 2010).  It might well be that the 
benefits politicians suggest they give to co-ethnics do not spread beyond a small group of 
relatives and cronies (Kasara, 2007). Moreover, we cannot be sure that politicians focus their 
efforts on co-ethnics. With respect to vote buying, the evidence of whether politicians target 
swing voters, seek to mobilise moderate supporters or reward core supporters is mixed (see 
e.g. Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008; Hicken, 2011). Politicians arguably want to transfer 
resources to groups with high expected ‘rates of return’ in terms of political support at the 
polls, and if voters for some non-instrumental reason prefer seeing their co-ethnics in office, 
politicians seeking power should have to expend less money and effort in securing their co-
ethnics’ support (Kasara, 2007). Correspondingly, and as noted by Kramon (2011), vote 
buying could potentially be a way to compensate for a lack of common ethnic identity, 
signalling to recipients that the candidate is a credible patron despite the fact that expectations 
of ethnic favouritism would suggest otherwise. This idea suggests vote buying to be 
particularly effective with non-coethnics. While, as noted above, Kramon’s (2011) own 
empirical results are more consistent with the earlier argument – that vote buying strengthens 
support of co-ethnic politicians – the findings of Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) indicate that in the 
2007 Kenyan election, reported vote buying was higher among the ethnic groups without a 
presidential candidate contending in the elections, presumably suggesting that candidates used 
ethnic affiliations to target potential swing voters. 
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The above discussion raises some interesting questions. In particular, at the contextual 
(country or local) level, is clientelism more prevalent and accepted in ethnically divided 
regions? And at the individual level, is ethnic group affiliation a stable predictor of support 
for and individual experiences with clientelism? In the next section, we discuss how to 
approach these questions empirically, and in particular how to measure clientelism and what 
forms of ethnic divisions are relevant to consider in this context. 
 
3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
To investigate the relationship between ethnic divisions and clientelism, we use detailed 
individual level survey data covering roughly 21 600 respondents from 15 African countries.
1
 
The data is obtained from the Afrobarometer, which is a comprehensive multi-country survey 
project collecting data on political and economic attitudes and behaviour of African citizens. 
As such, it is uniquely suited to study experiences with vote buying and clientelism in a large 
African multi-country sample. The survey covers a representative sample of each country’s 
adult population
2
  and asks a standard set of questions in all countries, thus allowing for cross-
national comparisons. Using the third wave of the survey, which was conducted in 2005-2006 
and contains key questions on clientelism, we estimate the following benchmark probits for 
the clientelism outcome iClient of individual i: 
 
   ciiii regEthnicIndEthnicClientprob γδRβX  1 . 
 
That is, the probability that individual i has the concerned experience with, perception of, or 
attitudes to clientelism is taken to depend on individual ethnic affiliation iIndEthnic , regional 
ethnic variables regEthnic , individual controls iX , and regional controls iR , allowing for 
country fixed effects cγ .    denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
 
                                                          
1
 Namely Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Cape Verde, Lesotho and Madagascar are excluded since 
they display essentially no variation in terms of ethnic group affiliations (in Cape Verde, 99.7 percent of the 
respondents belong to the same language group, and in Lesotho and Madagascar the equivalent figures are 98.2 
and 99.6 percent). Moreover, the questions on support for clientelism and ethnic identity are not asked in 
Zimbabwe, and the co-ethnic with the president variable is not available for Mozambique and Tanzania, meaning 
that the effective estimation sample varies depending on specification. 
2
 For more information about the Afrobarometer sampling procedures and survey methods, see Bratton et al. 
(2005). 
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3.1 Dependent variables 
 
We use three different dependent variables capturing 1) personal experiences with vote 
buying, 2) perceived prevalence of vote buying, and 3) attitudes to clientelism in a wider 
sense. Considering the sensitivity of the subject, approaching it from different angles is 
necessary. 
To capture personal experiences with vote buying, we use the question, ‘During the last 
election, how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you 
something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?’, creating a dummy variable taking the 
value one if this happened at least once, and zero if it never happened. When asking 
respondents about their own experiences with vote buying, there is likely to be a certain 
degree of under-reporting due to social desirability bias or fear of legal action (see discussion 
in Kramon, 2011). Reassuringly, the question above does not ask whether respondents in fact 
accepted money for their vote, but merely if they were approached by someone making them 
an offer to this effect. Hence, an answer in the affirmative does not mean that the respondent 
admits to selling their vote. Nevertheless, the fact that the question concerns them personally 
is still likely to cause some under-reporting.  
For this reason, it is useful to also consider an indicator that is more detached from direct 
personal experiences. To measure the perceived prevalence of vote buying, we use a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the respondent answers ‘often’ or ‘always’ to the question ‘In 
your opinion, how often do politicians do each of the following: Offer gifts to voters during 
election campaigns?’ (and zero if the answer is 'never', 'rarely' or 'don't know').  
Finally, to capture people’s attitudes to clientelism in a wider sense, we use a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent in response to the question, ‘Which of the 
following statements is closest to your view? A: Since leaders represent everyone, leaders 
should not favour their own family or group. B: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help 
their home community’, agrees more with the latter statement. 
Looking at Figures A1-A3, we can note that there is substantial country variation in 
experiences with, perceptions of and attitudes to clientelism. The share reporting to have been 
offered something in return for their vote ranges from around 2 percent in Botswana to around 
42 percent in Kenya. Similarly, while high overall, the shares reporting that it is common for 
politicians to offer gifts to voters during election campaigns range from 41 percent in Namibia 
to 94 percent in Kenya. Broadly speaking, the countries with relatively low shares reporting 
personal experiences with vote buying are also the countries where the perceived prevalence 
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of vote buying is comparatively low, and vice versa. Kenya stands out as the sample country 
where vote buying attempts are most prevalent. Support for clientelism, measured in terms of 
whether respondents consider that politicians are obliged to support their own community 
rather than society in general, is on the other hand comparatively low in Kenya. In fact, there 
is seemingly no clear-cut link between clientelism support, which ranges between 8 percent in 
Malawi and 41 percent in Nigeria, and the prevalence of vote buying.  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
 
Our main explanatory variables focus on ethnic divisions. While measures of ethnic divisions 
are commonly used in the economics literature and in studies of African politics, it is 
important to note that ethnicity is a complex concept that is difficult to measure. In the present 
paper, we think of ethnic groups as socially constructed identities originating in a shared 
culture. While there is not necessarily one right way to specify the set of ethnic groups in a 
country, the very notion of an ethnic group arguably implies that members and non-members 
recognise the distinction between groups, meaning that a reasonable list of ethnic groups in a 
country should depend on what people in the country themselves identify as relevant ethnic 
groupings (Fearon, 2003).  
To proxy for ethnic group affiliations, we use the question, ‘Which 
[Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your home language?’, where respondents answer in 
terms of their local language. Language is commonly used to capture ethnic affiliations. 
Presenting the findings of the first round of the Afrobarometer, Bratton et al. (2005, p. 428) 
argue that it ‘remains the best single marker of cultural identity and is used by Africans 
themselves as a quick and reliable way to attribute ethnicity’ (see also the discussion in 
Posner, 2003). The data material allows us to construct roughly 250 ethnic group dummies, 
which in turn can be used to create ethnic division measures of interest. As outlined above, 
ethnic divisions both at the contextual (country or local) and individual levels are relevant for 
our purposes. Hence, we consider two groups of ethnic division variables: 1) contextual 
measures capturing ethnic fragmentation and ethnic sentiments and 2) individual level 
variables intended to capture variation in the likelihood of being the subject of ethno-regional 
favouritism. 
With respect to the former, most studies of ethnic divisions focus on ethnic 
fractionalisation (see e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; 
Alesina et al., 2003; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Kimenyi, 2006), typically measured by an 
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index capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to 
different ethnic groups.
3
 Importantly, however, this measure focuses only on the number and 
size of ethnic groups, and does not reveal whether people in fact identify themselves in ethnic 
terms. Put differently, they provide no information on the salience of ethnic divisions. Ethnic 
dividing lines do not automatically become politicised. On the contrary, empirical findings 
suggest that the salience of ethnic identities largely depends on political mobilisation and 
institutional design (Reilly, 2001; Posner, 2003; Miguel, 2004; Eifert et al., 2009). Being 
interested in the relationship between clientelism – i.e. targeted benefits in exchange for 
political support – and ethnic divisions, the political salience of ethnic dividing lines is clearly 
central. Reilly (2001) describes an ethnically divided society as a society that is both 
ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage. In line with this 
description, when measuring ethnic divisions at the contextual level we will seek to capture 
both fragmentation and the strength of ethnic identification. 
However, we start by considering the type of ethnic division measure that is most 
common in the literature, namely an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF). 
Measuring it at the regional (sub-national province) level gives the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a region belong to different ethnic groups. Next, to get a 
picture of the salience of ethnic divisions, we consider whether people actually identify 
themselves in ethnic terms, creating a dummy variable indicating whether the individual 
reports to identify more in terms of his/her ethnic group than in terms of his/her nationality, as 
well as a regional variable giving the share of respondents identifying in ethnic terms. 
Conceivably though, the contextual ethnic division variable that is relevant for clientelist 
outcomes should, in line with Reilly’s (2001) definition of an ethnically divided society, pick 
up both whether the region is ethnically diverse and whether ethnicity is a politically salient 
cleavage. Hence, we also consider a multiplicative term capturing both regional ethnic 
fractionalisation and regional ethnic identities. Looking at Figures A4-A6, we can note that 
there is considerable country variation in number of ethnic groups and degree of ethnic 
fragmentation and identification. 
At the individual level, a relevant ethnic affiliation measure should, in line with the 
discussion in Section 2, capture whether an individual belongs to an ethnic group that is close 
to the ruling elite and thus might expect to be on the receiving end of clientelist transfers. 
                                                          
3
 In addition, there are studies focusing on ethnic polarisation in terms of group size (see e.g. Esteban and Ray, 
1994; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), and more recently on the extent of economic inequalities across 
ethnic groups (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Alesina et al., 2012) and geographical segregation of groups (Alesina 
and Zhuravskaya, 2011). 
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Following some recent studies (see e.g. Franck and Rainer, 2012), we first consider a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country’s 
president. Considering that African politics tends to be highly centralised around the head of 
government and that the ethnic group of the president is often thought to be the most favoured 
and politically dominant, this measure should be relevant (see the discussion in Franck and 
Rainer, 2012). Next, in an attempt to distinguish ethnic from regional favouritism – taking 
into account that scholars tend to speak of ‘ethno-regional favouritism’ (see discussion in 
Kudamatsu, 2009) – we construct a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives 
in the president’s region of origin. In additional estimations we also consider the regional 
share of president co-ethnics, as well as an interaction term between being a co-ethnic of the 
president and living in the president’s region of origin. 
Furthermore, we seek to control for other factors – not depending on individual ethnic 
affiliations – possibly affecting experiences with, perceptions of, and attitudes to clientelism. 
Just as respondents’ ethnic affiliations could affect to what extent they expect to be on the 
receiving end of clientelist transfers, and to what extent they are exposed to clientelist offers, 
so could presumably other socio-demographic characteristics. Hence, we include controls for 
the age, gender, urban/rural residence, level of education, religious affiliation, employment 
status and economic standing of respondents. Similarly, just as the extent of politically salient 
ethnic divisions around which one could organise clientelist networks and ethnically based 
targeted benefits could affect the prevalence of and attitudes towards clientelism, so could 
reasonably other contextual factors. Hence, we include controls for sub-national regional
4
 
averages in terms of education, employment, economic standing, rurality (the share of 
respondents living in rural areas) and religion. In alternative estimations, we instead use 
region fixed effects. Finally, country dummies are included to control for country variation in 
average levels of our clientelism outcomes. For variable descriptions and summary statistics, 
see Tables A1-A2. 
 
3.3 Field interviews in Kenya 
 
To better understand the causal mechanisms involved, we complement the statistical analysis 
with observations from key informant interviews conducted in Kenya shortly after the 2013 
national elections. As noted above, Kenya stands out as the sample country where vote buying 
                                                          
4
 The regions refer to the first-order administrative division in a country, in the data codebook denoted ‘province 
or region’. 
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is most prevalent. Moreover, it has the largest number of ethnic groups and the highest ethnic 
fractionalisation (here measured at the country level), as well as a relatively high share of 
citizens identifying themselves in ethnic terms (see Figures A4-A6). As such, and considering 
the timing of the field visit – shortly after the 2013 national elections – as well as its known 
history of ethnically based clientelist politics (see e.g. Wrong, 2009), Kenya constitutes a very 
interesting case. Our interview subjects include senior representatives from public policy and 
governance research institutes, government agencies working with social cohesion and 
electoral arrangements, donors, the political science and economics departments at the 
University of Nairobi, and a former member of parliament. 
 
4 Results 
 
In this section we present the results of empirical estimations of the relationship between 
clientelism and ethnic divisions. After considering the results of the benchmark estimations 
for the 15 African countries in our sample, we explore country heterogeneity in the results and 
present some illustrative field observations from Kenya.    
 
4.1 Main results 
 
To begin with, let us consider the role of ethnic fractionalisation, i.e. the type of ethnic division 
measure that is most common in the literature (see discussion in Section 2.3). Looking at 
Columns 1-3 in Table 1, we can note that while, as expected, the marginal effects of higher 
fractionalisation on the concerned clientelist outcomes are all positive, only in the case of 
support for clientelism is it statistically significant at the ten percent level.
5
 Hence, while there 
is some indication that a higher regional level of ethnic fragmentation is associated with greater 
                                                          
5
 For the sake of brevity, the main results tables present only our key explanatory variables, i.e. individual ethnic 
affiliations and regional ethnic divisions. However, for a snapshot of the estimated effects of the individual and 
regional control variables, see Table A3. Among the individual level control variables, we can for instance note 
that more educated people are less supportive of clientelist policies, perceive vote buying to be more prevalent 
and more often report to have direct experience with the same. While one might expect politicians offering 
patronage to target uninformed and less educated voters, this could reflect educated citizens being more exposed 
to situations where political campaigning takes place as well as more aware of what counts as illicit campaigning 
strategies. Moreover, and in line with previous findings suggesting that the poor may be more susceptible to vote 
buying and clientelist appeals (see e.g. Bratton, 2008; Nichter, 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010; Kramon, 
2011, Isaksson, 2014; Lindberg and Weghorst, 2013), the estimations indicate that poorer citizens are more 
likely to have experienced vote buying and to support clientelist policies. The regional variables, on the other 
hand, seemingly do comparatively little to explain individuals’ experiences with, perceptions of and attitudes to 
clientelism. 
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support for clientelism, regional ethnic fragmentation does not stand out as a statistically 
significant determinant of individuals’ personal experience with and perceived prevalence of 
vote buying. Comparing within countries, and controlling for relevant individual and regional 
characteristics, the regional level of ethnic fragmentation thus seems to play a limited role for 
the concerned clientelist outcomes. As noted, however, measures of ethnic fragmentation focus 
only on the number and size of ethnic groups and provide no information on the political 
salience of ethnic divisions. 
In a next step, we therefore turn to the extent to which people actually identify in ethnic 
terms – measured at the individual level and as a regional average (Columns 4-6, Table 1). As it 
turns out, though, whether the individual identifies in ethnic terms does not seem to matter 
much for the concerned clientelist outcomes. For personal experience and perceived prevalence 
of vote buying, the marginal effects of the individual ethnic identity variable are far from 
statistically significant. This is not necessarily surprising as it might be more reasonable to 
attribute the prevalence of vote buying to contextual rather than individual variation in ethnic 
identities. With the discussion in Section 2 in mind, one might, however, expect the individual’s 
ethnic identity to matter for the extent to which he or she supports clientelist policies. While the 
estimation in Column 6 does not contradict this idea, the positive marginal effect of ethnic 
identification on support for clientelism is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
With respect to contextual variation in ethnic identities, a greater regional share identifying 
themselves in ethnic rather than national terms is associated with a higher perceived prevalence 
of vote buying. Compared with someone living in a region where all people identify in national 
terms, an individual living in a region where everyone identifies in ethnic terms is about 15 
percentage points more likely to report that vote buying is prevalent (statistically significant at 
the ten percent level). Moreover, the regional share identifying in ethnic terms is positively 
related to personal experiences with vote buying, although the marginal effect is not statistically 
significant at the ten percent level (p=0.13). Overall, however, the individual and regional 
ethnic identity variables arguably have surprisingly weak explanatory power.  
Using a multiplicative term capturing both regional fractionalisation and regional ethnic 
identities (Columns 7-9, Table 1), in line with Reilly’s (2001) definition of an ethnically 
divided society, the positive marginal effect on the perceived prevalence of vote buying comes 
out more precisely estimated than when considering regional ethnic identity in isolation. Still, 
though, it is not significantly related to support for clientelist policies and personal experiences 
with vote buying. 
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Finding that regional ethnic fragmentation and individual and regional ethnic identification 
do comparatively little to explain the concerned clientelist outcomes, let us instead turn to 
specific ethnic affiliations. In particular, we are interested in the possible effects of ethno-
regional favouritism, and thus whether the respondent can expect to be at the receiving end of 
clientelist transfers. For this purpose, we consider whether respondents’ are co-ethnics with 
their country’s president and whether they live in their president’s region of origin (Table 2). 
First, we can note that compared with people from other ethnic groups, there is some 
indication that respondents belonging to the same ethnic group as the president (Columns 1-3) 
are less likely to have been offered something in return for their vote and to perceive vote 
buying as prevalent (statistically significant at the ten percent level). To some extent, one might 
worry that this result is driven by president co-ethnics being more loyal to the regime and thus 
less likely to reveal information that could reflect badly on the government. However, including 
a variable to control for attitudes to the government (measured as the share of ten questions on 
government performance to which the respondent answers that the government handles the 
concerned issue ‘very badly’) does not change the result. An alternative, and more substantive, 
interpretation would instead be that the sitting government counts on the support of co-ethnics 
and instead targets vote buying efforts to potential swing voters from other groups. This idea, 
which suggests that ethnic affiliations are used when targeting clientelist offers, but that 
candidates target members of other groups rather than their own, is in line with the findings of 
Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) for Kenya and with Kramon’s (2011) proposition that vote buying 
could be a way to compensate for a lack of common ethnic identity.  
If co-ethnics of the president are more likely than people from other ethnic groups to be on 
the receiving end of targeted benefits – as the literature on ethnic favouritism would suggest –
one would expect president co-ethnics to be more supportive of clientelist policies. However, if 
targeting swing voters from other groups is considered to give greater payoffs in terms of 
securing political support (see the reasoning in Kasara, 2007), and targeted benefits thus do not 
disproportionally accrue to the own group, the opposite might be true. The estimation in 
Column 3 suggests no difference between co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics in terms of support for 
clientelism, either indeed suggesting no systematic relationship between the two variables or 
possibly masking a heterogeneous effect. Hence, the empirical estimations raise questions on 
the targeting of clientelist offers – in particular whether candidates focus targeted benefits on 
core or swing supporters, and whether ethnic group affiliations are used as a proxy to make this 
distinction. 
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Indeed, maybe what matters in the distribution of patronage is not primarily people’s ethnic 
affiliation, but rather their region of residence. As noted, scholars tend not to separate ethnic 
from regional favouritism but rather speak of it jointly, as ‘ethno-regional favouritism’. Hence, 
in Columns 4-6 we instead consider a dummy variable indicating whether the respondents live 
in the president’s region of origin. Again, the results suggest that those belonging to the 
potentially advantaged group – here those living in the president’s home region – are less likely 
to have been offered something in return for their vote (statistically significant at the ten percent 
level). And once more, adding the control for government discontent does not change this 
picture. Moreover, respondents living in the president’s home region do not stand out in an 
equivalent manner in terms of the extent to which they judge vote buying as prevalent. If people 
base this judgment on, say, media reports on countrywide conditions, this could be seen as 
further support for the possibility that the difference in reported personal vote buying 
experience is not driven by government loyalty. However, to the extent that their judgment is 
based on observations of people in their immediate surroundings, i.e. people who also live in 
the president’s home region, we should not put too much weight on the observed difference in 
vote buying experiences.  
Perhaps most interestingly, though, unlike co-ethnics of the president, who did not stand 
out from people from other ethnic groups in terms of support for clientelism, the results in 
Column 6 suggest that people living in the president’s region of origin are nine percentage 
points more likely than people in other regions to support clientelist policies. This finding could 
be taken to indicate that compared with co-ethnics of the president, people living in the 
president’s region of origin to a greater extent view themselves as likely to be on the receiving 
end of clientelist transfers, i.e. that regional targeting of clientelist transfers is more prevalent 
than ethnically based targeting.  
Importantly, however, geographical segregation of ethnic groups of course means that there 
will tend to be an overlap between being a co-ethnic with the president and living in the 
president’s region of origin. Indeed, whereas in the president's region of origin, the average 
share of president co-ethnics is 46 percent; in other regions the equivalent share is only 21 
percent. In an attempt to disentangle these influences, in Columns 7-9 we consider both whether 
respondents are co-ethnics with the president and whether they live in the president’s region of 
origin. When included in the same estimation, neither of the ethno-regional variables come out 
significantly related to personal experiences with vote buying or the perceived prevalence of 
vote buying (both marginal effects are still negative though). Considering support for 
clientelism, however, it is interesting to note that whereas living in the president’s region of 
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origin is still positively related to clientelism support, co-ethnics of the president are, compared 
with non-coethnics, actually five percentage points less supportive of the same. A possible 
interpretation of this finding is that it reflects discontent with clientelist transfers targeted e.g. 
regionally rather than to members of the ethnic group.
6
  
 
4.2 Country heterogeneity in results 
 
As noted, African politics is often described as heavily influenced by ethnically based 
clientelism, and our sample countries have in common that they are relatively young 
democracies located in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is important to note that they are by 
no means homogenous, neither with respect to the dependent variables, i.e. the extent to 
which their citizens experience, perceive and support clientelism (see Figures A1-A3), nor as 
regards the existence, nature and salience of ethnic divisions (see Figures A4-A6). Hence, it is 
interesting to consider to what extent the patterns observed in the pooled sample estimations 
can be observed in the individual countries. Unfortunately, the fact that many of our key 
explanatory variables are measured at the regional level means that in estimations focusing on 
the individual country sub-samples, we are restricted by limited degrees of freedom.
7
 Running 
separate regressions for each sample country, we are therefore unable to include the regional 
controls included in the pooled sample estimations and must interpret the key explanatory 
variables measured at the regional level with care, taking into account that they will most 
likely pick up substantial unobserved regional variation.  
With this caveat in mind, we run individual country estimations focusing on the 
composite measure taking account of ethnic fragmentation and ethnic identification, as well as 
individual level controls (the results are available upon request). In the pooled sample, while 
the individual ethnic fragmentation and ethnic identification variables did little to explain the 
concerned clientelist outcomes, this measure was found to be positively related to the 
                                                          
6
 In a separate set of estimations (available upon request) we also include a variable giving the share of president 
co-ethnics in the region. Just as the dummy for being a co-ethnic of the president, this variable comes out 
negatively related to support for clientelism (and not significantly related to the other two outcome variables). 
Hence, conditional on whether or not the respondent is a co-ethnic of the president and lives in the president’s 
region of origin, living in a region with a larger share of co-ethnics is associated with less support for clientelism. 
This could possibly reflect particularly strong discontent with clientelist transfers targeted to the president’s home 
region in other regions with strong representation of the president’s ethnic group. Furthermore, running estimations 
adding an interaction term between being a co-ethnic of the president and living in the president’s region of origin 
(again, the results are available upon request) reveals no significant interaction effect between the two variables 
and does not change the main results of Table 2, Columns 7-9.  
7
 Most of our sample countries are divided into at least ten sub-national regions (in Nigeria and Tanzania the 
figure is as high as 31 and 26, respectively). However, Uganda and Malawi are divided into only four and three 
regions, respectively. 
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perceived prevalence of vote buying. Running separate regressions for each country sub-
sample, it has a positive marginal effect on the perceived prevalence of vote buying in 7 out 
of 14 countries, and a negative marginal effect in three countries. In line with the pooled 
sample results, the measure is not to the same extent significantly related with direct 
experiences with, or support for, clientelism in the individual countries. Equivalent individual 
country estimations including the dummy for being a co-ethnic with the president and the 
dummy for living in the president’s region of origin, seemingly suggest that the pooled 
sample result indicating that people living in the president’s region of origin are more 
supportive of clientelism and that co-ethnics of the president are less supportive of the same is 
driven by relatively few countries. While, as noted, these results need to be interpreted with 
care, this should serve as a reminder that the pooled sample results do not reflect a 
homogenous pattern across our sample countries. 
 
4.3 Field observations from Kenya 
 
In Kenya, ethnically based clientelism has received a lot of attention (see e.g. Wrong, 2009). 
And indeed, all of our Kenyan interview respondents (see Section 3.3) agree that ethnicity 
plays a major role for voting in the country. Furthermore, the motivation for voting in ethnic 
terms is reportedly to a large extent instrumental, resting on the assumption that a co-ethnic 
will be the most reliable patron, i.e. the most likely to deliver on promises of private (and 
public) goods to the benefit of the ethnic group. As one interview respondent put it: ‘Ethnicity 
is a vehicle, it helps you get what you want’.  
At the same time, however, several interview respondents emphasise that the role of 
ethnic voting needs to be qualified. It is not as simple as everyone votes for a candidate from 
their own ethnic group. The ethnic landscape is more complex than that, with a multitude of 
small ethnic groups with no realistic chance of winning an election based on their numbers. 
Hence, one has to consider group size, and in particular whether groups are large enough to 
constitute viable ethnic coalition partners. Rather than voting for a member of their own 
group, voters from small groups will vote for the candidate perceived as most likely to 
incorporate the smaller group’s interests. Furthermore, respondents point out that many 
people consider proximity rather than ethnicity, believing the candidate will deliver to the 
home region. 
With respect to outright vote buying, most interview respondents claim that it is common 
for party representatives to hand out cash or goods such as sugar or flour with the instruction 
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to vote for a certain candidate. While vote buying is illegal, considering the extent of poverty, 
it is difficult to ask people not to accept gifts. As one respondent noted, what one can do is 
encourage voters not to let the bribes influence how they vote. After all, the fact that the ballot 
is secret means that it should be difficult to enforce the agreement on election day. In line 
with this, interview respondents note that it is common for voters to accept bribes from 
different candidates. In our empirical estimations on experiences with vote buying, we have 
no information on the party affiliation/s of the representative/s offering respondents bribes in 
return for their votes. While it has been suggested that vote buying is more feasible for an 
incumbent with real resources to spend and that political challengers lacking economic 
resources are more likely to resort to voter intimidation (Collier and Vicente, 2012), having 
this information would have allowed for more precise interpretations of the relationship 
between being a co-ethnic of the president (/living in the president’s region of origin) and own 
experiences with vote buying. 
Furthermore, politicians offering gifts is not described as something that is frowned upon 
among voters, rather the opposite. Among poor people, it could be seen as a sign of 
generosity, and of politicians being aware of and caring about the needs of its poor voters. It 
could also be seen as an important signal of the candidate’s willingness and ability to provide 
a continued flow of transfers once elected. There is no mention of ethnically targeted vote 
buying. However, vote buying is reportedly particularly prevalent in poor areas and informal 
settlements.  
The field interviews also highlight the relevance of considering voter incentives in a 
wider sense. Our interview respondents stress that bribes are not only used to buy votes in a 
strict sense, but also to mobilise people, e.g. to take part in campaign activities and to register 
to vote.
8
 This could involve handing out cash or goods like the ones described above to people 
taking part in large rallies. However, it could also involve items that in the West would be 
described as campaign merchandise rather than bribes, but which in Kenya are more 
important due to the level of poverty. As described by one respondent, a campaign t-shirt does 
not only carry the party logo, it is also a garment for the person to wear. Similarly, 
respondents suggest that parties use bribes to ensure that voters from their strongholds 
actually register to vote, and correspondingly, that illegitimate practices (e.g. buying voter 
                                                          
8
 In the empirical analysis above, one dependent variable (Experience) captures experiences with vote buying in 
the strict sense of having been offered something ‘in return for your vote’. Our second dependent variable 
(Prevalence) is broader, however, capturing the perception of how common it is for politicians to ‘offer gifts to 
voters during election campaigns’, i.e. not necessarily explicitly in return for their vote. 
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registration cards) are sometimes used to discourage voter registration and voting in the 
opposing candidate’s strongholds.  
Kenya is clearly a country where ethnic divisions play an important role in politics. In 
other African countries, such as neighbouring Tanzania, ethnic groups are not necessarily 
equally politically salient (see e.g. Miguel, 2004). Yet, the field interviews in Kenya 
demonstrate that the links between ethnic divisions and clientelist transfers are by no means 
clear-cut. Regarding ethnic voting to ensure future clientelist transfers, respondents emphasise 
that the ethnic landscape is complex with many small groups that have no realistic chance of 
winning an election based on their numbers, and that people may consider coalition partners 
from different ethnic groups or a candidate’s regional proximity rather than their ethnicity. 
With respect to vote buying, the role of poverty rather than ethnicity is highlighted, and 
regarding voter incentives in a wider sense, respondents point to targeting of party 
strongholds rather than of members of specific groups. Considering that these complexities 
are highlighted in a country known for its politically salient ethnic dividing lines, it is 
understandable that the links between ethnic divisions and clientelism are far from clear-cut in 
a large sample including 15 different African countries.  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The present paper started from two observations: 1) African politics is often described as 
clientelist in the sense that rulers rely on particularised loyalties and the distribution of 
personal favours in exchange for political support, and 2) African clientelist networks are 
commonly suggested to have an ethnic dimension. Ethnically based parties tend to redistribute 
toward their ethnic group rather than provide public goods, the argument goes, and citizens 
tend to vote for candidates who represent their group. While these arguments seem to suggest 
that clientelism should be more prevalent and accepted in ethnically divided societies, we are 
not aware of any studies exploring these linkages more closely. Against this background, we 
investigated the relationship between ethnic divisions and clientelism, asking whether – and 
what type of – ethnic divisions affect the prevalence of and attitudes to clientelism. 
The discussion of the need for politicians to establish a dependable clientelist network, 
and the suggested use of ethnic affiliations as a proxy for voter behaviour to delineate the 
clientelist network and target clientelist transfers, raised some interesting empirical questions. 
At the contextual level, does the presence of politically salient ethnic divisions around which 
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one could organise clientelist networks and ethnically based targeted benefits imply a greater 
prevalence and acceptance of clientelism? And at the individual level, does the commonly 
suggested existence of ethnic favouritism in African politics imply that ethnic group 
affiliation is a stable predictor of support for and individual experiences with clientelism? 
With respect to the former, empirical findings drawing on data for more than 20 000 
respondents across 15 African countries provide some indication that a higher regional level 
of ethnic fragmentation is associated with greater support for clientelism, and that a greater 
regional share identifying in ethnic terms is associated with a higher perceived prevalence of 
vote buying. A variable capturing both regional fragmentation and regional ethnic identities 
also comes out positively related to the latter. Overall, however, the regional ethnic 
fragmentation and ethnic identification variables have weak explanatory power for the 
concerned clientelist outcomes, as does our measure of individual ethnic identification.  
Turning to the possible individual level effects of being the subject of ethno-regional 
favouritism, somewhat surprisingly, the results indicate that compared with people from other 
ethnic groups, co-ethnics of the president are, if anything, less likely to have been offered 
something in return for their vote, and – conditional on whether or not they live in the 
president’s region of origin – less supportive of clientelism. In an attempt to distinguish ethnic 
from regional favouritism, in a next step we considered respondents’ regional residence. The 
results indicate that while people living in the president’s region of origin are also, if anything, 
less likely than people from other regions to have experiences with vote buying, they are on the 
other hand more supportive of clientelism in a wider sense. With respect to vote buying, one 
interpretation of these findings could be that the incumbents in our sample countries in fact did 
not primarily target vote buying efforts to people from their ethnic group or home region – who 
might be judged to support them irrespectively – but instead focused on potential swing voters 
from other groups/regions. The literature on whether politicians attempting to buy votes 
predominantly target core supporters or swing voters is indeed far from settled. As regards 
support for clientelism, these findings could be taken to indicate that compared with co-ethnics 
of the president, people living in the president’s region of origin to a greater extent view 
themselves as likely to be on the receiving end of clientelist transfers, i.e. that regional targeting 
of clientelist transfers is more prevalent than ethnically based targeting. Indeed, unlike, say, 
employment opportunities in the civil service, many potential voter benefits, e.g. public goods 
and services such as roads, schools and hospitals, should for administrative reasons be more 
feasible to target regionally. 
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Overall, the empirical results cast doubt on the idea that there is a close and straightforward 
relationship between ethnic divisions and the experiences with, perceptions of, and attitudes to 
clientelism. First, contextual measures of ethnic fragmentation and contextual and individual 
measures of ethnic identification have little explanatory power. Furthermore, considering ethno-
regional favouritism, the empirical findings seemingly point more to the relevance of regionally 
rather than ethnically based targeting of clientelist transfers. Importantly, however, the results 
display substantial country heterogeneity, and field interviews from Kenya illustrate a number 
of complexities that need to be taken into consideration when studying the relationship between 
ethnic divisions and clientelism. 
In general terms, though, the high prevalence of vote buying and the widespread support 
for clientelist policies reported in this paper call attention to the need to keep the monitoring of 
electoral practices and the promotion of impartiality in the state apparatus high on the agendas 
of donors and African governments. While the empirical results challenge the dominant role of 
ethnic divisions for clientelist politics in Africa, further research is needed on the targeting of 
clientelist benefits.  
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1: The role of ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic identities (probit marginal effects)      
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
is clientelist: experience prevalence support experience prevalence support experience prevalence support  
Regional ELF 0.037 0.038 0.090*       
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.048)       
Ethnic identity    0.009 -0.004 0.018    
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)    
Reg. eth. Ident.    0.170 0.154* 0.040    
    (0.113) (0.087) (0.088)    
RegELF x AvgEthid       0.129 0.311** 0.144 
       (0.154) (0.133) (0.165)  
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Observations 17538 20878 19843 16561 19833 19834 16569 19842 19843  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; The individual and regional controls refer to the 
explanatory variables included in Table A3. 
 
 
Table 2: The role of belonging to the president’s ethnic group and living in the president’s region of origin (probit marginal effects)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable is clientelist: experience prevalence support experience prevalence support experience prevalence support  
Co-ethnic with president -0.041* -0.030* -0.024    -0.032 -0.024 -0.050*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.016)    (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) 
President’s region of origin    -0.050* -0.023 0.092** -0.035 -0.026 0.111*** 
    (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.043) 
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Observations 15714 18575 17540 17538 20878 19843 15714 18575 17540  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; The individual and regional controls refer to the 
explanatory variables included in Table A3. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variable descriptions    
Dependent variables, clientelism 
Experience: Personal experiences with vote buying. Dummy variable equal to one if to the question, ‘During the last 
election, how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a 
gift, in return for your vote?’, the respondent answered that it happened at least once, and zero if it never 
happened (those with no experience of an election are excluded). 
Prevalence: Perceived prevalence of vote buying activity. Dummy variable equal to one if to the question ‘In your opinion, 
how often do politicians do each of the following: Offer gifts to voters during election campaigns?’ the respondent 
answers ‘often’ or ‘always’, and zero if the answer is 'never', 'rarely' or 'don't know'. 
Support: Respondent’s support for clientelist policies. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent, in response to the 
question, ‘Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A: Since leaders represent everyone, leaders 
should not favour their own family or group. B: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community’, 
agrees more with statement B. Question not asked in Zimbabwe. 
Ethnic division variables 
Ethnic group dummies: Based on the question ‘Which [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] language is your home language?’. 
Regional ELF: Gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a region (see below) belong to different ethnic 
groups. Measured as: 
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is the share of group i (i = 1…N) in region j. 
 
Ethnic identity: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to identify more in terms of his/her ethnic group 
than in terms of his/her nationality; zero otherwise. Question not asked in Zimbabwe. 
Regional ethnic identity: Regional share of respondents with an ethnic identity, according to the definition above (not 
available in Zimbabwe).  
ELF x AvgEthid: A multiplicative term capturing both regional ethnic fractionalisation and regional ethnic identity, i.e. ELF x 
regional ethnic identity (not available in Zimbabwe).  
Co-ethnic with president: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country’s 
president; zero otherwise. Based on externally compiled data on the ethnic group affiliations of the sample 
country’s president at the time of the survey. Consult at least two sources for each country, usually Encyclopedia 
Britannica complemented by other sources. Measure not available for Mozambique and Tanzania. 
President’s region of origin: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in the country’s president’s region of 
origin; zero otherwise. Based on externally compiled data on the home region of the sample country presidents at 
the time of the survey. Consult at least two sources for each country, usually Encyclopedia Britannica 
complemented by other sources. 
Regional share of president co-ethnics: The share of respondents in the region who are co-ethnics of the country president.  
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Rural: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a rural area; zero otherwise. 
Age variables: Age in years and age squared. 
Education (based on question about what the respondent’s highest level of education is):  
Primary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at primary school level 
(including those with incomplete primary); zero otherwise. Secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent’s highest level of education is at secondary school level (including those with incomplete secondary); 
zero otherwise. Post-secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at 
post-secondary school level (including those with incomplete post-secondary); zero otherwise. Dummy variable 
equal to one if the respondent has no formal schooling used as reference category in estimations. 
Employment: Full-time: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has full-time paid employment; zero otherwise. 
Part-time: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has part-time paid employment; zero otherwise. Dummy 
for having no employment used as reference category in estimations.  
Poverty index: A poverty index with mean zero and standard deviation one within each country. Higher values imply that 
the respondent is poorer. Constructed as the first principal component of the answers to, 'Over the past year, how 
often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) enough clean water for 
home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel to cook your food?’, with response categories 
ranging from 0 for ’never’ to 4 for ’always’ for each item. 
Religion (based on the question ‘What is your religion, if any?’). Christian: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent 
reports to be Christian; zero otherwise. Muslim: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to be 
Muslim; zero otherwise. Having another religious affiliation or not being religious is used as reference category in 
estimations. 
Regional control variables: Sub-national regional (first-order administrative division in each country) averages. 
Share educated: Share in region who have some secondary school or more education. 
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Av. poverty index: Average poverty index score in region. 
Share employed: Share in region who have paid employment (full-time or part-time). 
Share rural: Share in region who live in rural areas.   
Share Christian: Share in region who are Christian. 
Share Muslim: Share in region who are Muslim. 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 15 countries in the sample.   
 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables, clientelism 
     Experience 17538 0.222 0.416 0 1 
Prevalence 20878 0.716 0.451 0 1 
Support 19843 0.270 0.444 0 1 
Ethnic division variables 
    Regional ELF 20883 0.475 0.251 0 0.883 
Regional ethnic identity 19847 0.169 0.133 0 0.899 
ELF x AvgEthid 19847 0.081 0.077 0 0.556 
Ethnic identity 19838 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Co-ethnic with president 17430 0.252 0.434 0 1 
President’s region of origin 20883 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Regional share of president co-ethnics 17430 0.252 0.335 0 1 
Individual controls 
     Rural 20883 0.611 0.488 0 1 
Female 20883 0.496 0.500 0 1 
Age 20883 36.045 14.377 18 99 
Age squared 20883 1505.952 1266.864 324 9801 
Primary school 20883 0.377 0.485 0 1 
Secondary school 20883 0.359 0.480 0 1 
Post-secondary school 20883 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Part-time 20883 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Full-time 20883 0.240 0.427 0 1 
Poverty index 20883 -0.004 0.998 -1.879 3.999 
Christian 20883 0.672 0.470 0 1 
Muslim 20883 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Regional controls 
     Share educated 20883 0.468 0.246 0.028 0.969 
Avg. poverty index 20883 -0.002 0.343 -1.167 1.241 
Share employed 20883 0.374 0.200 0 0.932 
Share rural 20883 0.612 0.275 0 1 
Share Christian 20883 0.670 0.309 0 1 
Share Muslim 20883 0.230 0.340 0 1 
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Table A3: Effects of individual and regional control variables    
Dependent variable is: (1) Clientelism experience (2) Clientelism prevalence (3) Clientelism support  
Individual controls 
Rural -0.004 -0.040*** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Female -0.029*** -0.016** -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary school 0.029** 0.037*** -0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Secondary school 0.047*** 0.081*** -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Post-secondary school 0.054*** 0.098*** -0.034* 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) 
Part-time 0.019 -0.004 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) 
Full-time 0.001 0.007 -0.034*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Poverty index 0.027*** 0.009 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Christian 0.001 0.006 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Muslim 0.015 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) 
Regional controls 
Share educated 0.036 0.121 -0.121 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.083) 
Avg. poverty index 0.041 0.027 0.036 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) 
Share employed 0.084 0.097 0.106 
 (0.082) (0.064) (0.075) 
Share rural 0.014 -0.036 -0.043 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.045) 
Share Christian -0.020 0.184 -0.082 
 (0.160) (0.151) (0.146) 
Share Muslim -0.004 0.338** -0.061 
 (0.150) (0.142) (0.139)  
Country dummies yes yes yes  
Observations 17538 20878 19843  
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure A1: Share reporting to have been offered something in return for their vote during last election  
 
 
Figure A2: Share reporting that it is common for politicians to offer gifts to voters during election campaigns  
 
 
Figure A3: Share who support clientelism (consider that politicians are obliged to support own community)  
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Figure A4: Number of ethnic (language) groups, by country  
 
 
Figure A5: Estimated Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, by country  
 
 
 
Figure A6: Share identifying more strongly with their ethnic group than with their country  
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